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SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE - HOLDING PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS ACCOUNTABLE: THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
AND ITS POTENTIAL APPLICATION TO ABTAN, ETAL. V.
BLACKWA TER LODGE AND TRAINING CENTER, INC., ET AL.
Matthew C. Dahl'
Private security contractors play a prominent role in modem military
operations. Of course the use of paid forces is not a new concept. Militaries
utilized paid forces for hundreds of years, but technological advances have
increased the mobility and firepower of private security contractors.2 The United
States now relies heavily on the private military industry in conducting its
worldwide military operations.3  The U.S. used private security contractors to
conduct narcotics intervention operations in Columbia in the 1990's. 4 During the
conflict in the Balkans, the U.S. used a private security contractor to train Croat
troops to conduct operations against Serbian troops. 5  Contracting out these
operations allowed the U.S. to decrease its footprint in these conflicts, or leave no
footprint at all. Today the U.S. has as many as 30,000 private security contractors
in Iraq.6 However, repeated reports of misconduct by private security contractors
are making the industry endure a level of scrutiny never encountered before. This
note will focus on the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) as a civil remedy to the
misconduct by private security contractors overseas and how the case law
regarding the ATCA will affect the recent lawsuit brought in the case of Abtan v.
Blackwater.7
I. THE TREND TOWARD USING PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES
Governments use private security contractors for both practical and political
reasons. Private military companies provide a wide range of services from training
I J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law; B.A., History,
2004, Wake Forest University.
2. E.L. Gaston, Note, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security Industry and
its Implications for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 221, 234-
35 (2008).
3. JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL MERCENARY
ARMY xxi-xxii (Nation Books 2007) (discussing the rising size and reliance on private contractors and
the government's inability to monitor them).
4. Gaston, supra note 2, at 235-36.
5. Id. at 236.
6. Steve Fainaru, Iraq Contractors Face Growing Parallel War, WASH POST, June 16, 2007, at
Al.
7. Abtan v. Blackwater, No. 1:07-cv-01831 (D.D.C. second amended complaint filed Mar. 28,
2008) available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/3.28.08%20Abtan%20Second/ 20Amended /20
Complaint.pdf.
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to post-conflict/reconstruction support to direct military support.
8 On the practical
side, using private security contractors allows the military to delegate certain
functions it would normally have to perform on its own. This delegation allows
the military to focus its forces on higher priority issues. 9  From a political
perspective, using private security contractors allows countries to circumvent
governmental regulations on how many troops they can send into a conflict area. °
Governments also benefit politically by utilizing private security contractors
because public opinion is less affected by the injury or death of a contractor than
an enlisted soldier."
Private security contractors are used in conflicts of all sizes. Governments all
around the world are trending towards outsourcing military and security functions
to these private security contractors.1 2  Today, several hundred private security
firms exist around the world and have a combined annual revenue of $100
billion. 13 Countries in Africa used them in small scale regional conflicts. For
example, the government of Sierra Leone hired the South African private security
firm Executive Outcomes to conduct direct military operations against a rebel
group that took control of major diamond mines in the country.14
The U.S. continues to use them in the larger scale conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.' 5 Approximately 100,000 contractors are present in Iraq and a
significant number of them are security contractors. 16 This number is ten times the
number of contractors used by the U.S. in the first Persian Gulf War, and is almost
equal to the number of active duty military personnel in Iraq.17
The U.S. is growing increasingly more reliant on private security contractors
in its operations in Iraq. A 2007 House of Representatives memorandum noted
that as of March 2006, 181 private security firms operated in Iraq, employing
8. See, e.g., MPRI, International Security Sector Training and Education,
http://www.mpri.com/main/intemationalsecuritysectort.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) and Blackwater
Worldwide, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/company-profile/comp-history.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2008).
9. Bryan Terry, Note, Private Attorneys General v. "War Profiteers": Applying the False
Claims Act to Private Security Contractors in Iraq, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 809, 819 (2007).
10. Gaston, supra note 2, at 235-36 (discussing how the United States used Private security
contractors in Colombia to stay under congressionally set troop limits).
11. Id. at 235.
12. Id. at 224.
13. Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of the Government
Contract Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. &
Civ. LIBERTIES 365, 371 (2006).
14. Id. at 369.
15. Gaston, supra note 2, at 223.
16. Renae Merle, Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2006, at Dl.
See also Rakowsky, supra note 13, at 370.
17. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV'T REFORM, 1 10TH CONG., MEMORANDUM,
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR HEARING ON PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS, at 2 (Feb. 7, 2007),




48,000 employees. 18 During the reconstruction period in Iraq, the U.S. has spent
$3.8 billion on security contractors. 19 Salaries for employees of these contractors
can get as high as $33,000 a month.20 These numbers account for 12.5% of U.S.
government spending on reconstruction in Iraq.2 1 Notwithstanding this large
government expenditure on private security contractors, numerous reports of
contractors' misconduct have surfaced while no legal restraints exist to control
them.22
II. BLACKWATER
While hundreds of private security contractors are operating today, this article
focuses on just one - Blackwater Worldwide ("Blackwater"). Blackwater is a
major private security contractor used by the United States in Iraq, yet it remains
controversial due to reports of misconduct by its employees. 23  Blackwater's
alleged misconduct in Baghdad in 2007 led to the lawsuit Abtan v. Blackwater.24
Blackwater was founded by Erik Prince - a former Navy SEAL - on
December 26, 1996.25 The idea arose from of a perceived need to offer privatized
training for military and law enforcement.2 6 In an effort to fulfill this need, Prince
purchased 5,000 acres of land in eastern North Carolina for approximately $1.3
27million to create the Blackwater campus. Through its first few years
Blackwater's business and reputation grew rapidly as a facility offering tactical
training for all kinds of government officials. 28 However, the September 11 th
attacks and the subsequent "War on Terror" changed Blackwater into a major
player in the private security industry when it received $5.4 million to guard the
CIA's station in Kabul, Afghanistan. 29 Blackwater's role continued to grow and it
now has more than $500 million in government contracts.
30
Blackwater's operations as a government contractor came under intense
scrutiny after an incident at al-Nisoor Square in Baghdad on September 16, 2007.31
While investigations are still ongoing, the allegations are that unprovoked
18. Id. There were 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq in 2006 and 100,000 contractors. Of the major
security contractors there were 1,500 from DynCorp, 1,000 from Blackwater, 500 from MPRI, and
6,500 from Titan. Merle, supra note 16.
19. PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS MEMORANDUM, supra note 17, at 2
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 3.
23. See, e.g., Gaston, supra note 2, at 229-30.
24. Abtan v. Blackwater, No. 1:07-cv-01831 (D.D.C. second amended complaint filed Mar. 28,
2008).
25. SCAHILL, supra note 3, at 32.
26. Id. at 25-26.
27. Id. at 32.
28. Id. at 34.
29. Id. at 45.
30. Id. at xix.
31. Mark Apuzzo and Lara Jakes Jordan, FBI Finds Blackwater Trucks Patched, ABC NEWS, Jan.
13, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/WireStory?id=4125132&page=l (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
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Blackwater contractors opened fire in a crowded square in Baghdad.
32 The
incident resulted in the death of eleven Iraqi civilians and injuries to fourteen.
33
The attack prompted a full governmental investigation into the actions of
Blackwater and other security contractors employed by the U.S. government. A
memorandum sent out to the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform reported that internal reports from Blackwater documented 437 incidents
in which Blackwater contractors fired their weapons. 34 The reports showed that
from January 1 to September 12, 2005, Blackwater engaged in 195 shooting
incidents and 163 of those times, Blackwater personnel were the ones who fired
first.35 The reports suggested that the incidents resulted in 16 Iraqi civilian
casualties and 162 incidents in which property of Iraqi civilians was damaged.36
III. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT (ATCA)
The Alien Tort Claims Act was passed in 1789 as a means by which citizens
of other countries could bring tort actions in the federal district courts of the United
States.37 While the ATCA was passed over two hundred years ago, its use was
limited until around 1980.38 In 1980, the Second Circuit handed down its decision
in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and reintroduced the ATCA as a way to hold actors
responsible for their actions even though those actions may have taken place on
foreign soil.3 9 The Filartiga decision recognized a three-part test - 1) an alien 2)
must allege a tort 3) committed in violation of the law of nations or a U.S. treaty -
in order to bring a suit based on the ATCA.40 The Second Circuit found for the
plaintiffs in Filartiga and held that the ATCA grants jurisdiction for U.S. federal
courts over torts identified under international law.41
The Filartiga decision marked the beginning of the federal courts'
interpretation and expansion of the reach of the ATCA. Courts later held that
individuals, not just sovereign states, could be liable under the ATCA.42  The
courts expressed willingness to construe the ATCA so that: 1) individuals could be
held liable under the ATCA for crimes that they commit in furtherance of genocide
or war crimes;43 2) groups of individuals who are not States, but nonetheless
32. Abtan, No. 1:07-cv-01831 at 3.
33. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV'T REFORM, 110TH CONG., MEMORANDUM,
ADDITIONAL NFORMATION ABOUT BLACKWATER USA, at 6 (OCT. 1, 2007), available at:
http:/oversight.house.gov/documents/20071001121609.pdf [hereinafter BLACK\WATER MEMORANDUM]
34. Id.
35. ld.
36. Id. at 7.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
38. Tina Garmon, Comment. Domesticating International Coiporate Responsibiliti: Holding
Private Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, I 1 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325,
339 (2003).
39. Filartiga N. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
40. Garmon, supra note 38, at 339 (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887).
41. Id. at 340 (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885).
42. Id. at 340-43.
43 Id. at 341-42 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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violate international laws; 44 and 3) corporations that work with States to violate
international law.45 The courts also recognized secondary liability as a mechanism
to bring parties under the umbrella of the ATCA. 46 This secondary liability theory
implicates any actor that "knowingly" aids others by "directly and substantially
affecting the commission of [a] crime [violating international law]., 47 Another
theory upheld by federal courts that imputes liability under the ATCA is the "joint
action" theory. 48 The Southern District of New York said ATCA liability existed
under the "'joint action" theory if the plaintiff could prove that an individual
willfully participated in actions with a State actor to violate international law.49
Federal courts recognize ATCA liability under the theories listed above. In
the next section the facts and law of four cases will be analyzed to show how the
federal courts construe liability under the ATCA. After that the analyses of those
cases will be applied to show how the ATCA can be used in the pending case of
4btan v. Blackwater and in potential future cases.
A. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: The Modern Interpretation of the ATCA
The suit in Filartiga was brought by a doctor in Paraguay whose son was
tortured and killed because Dr. Filartiga was a political activist who opposed the
government in Paraguay at the time.50  Following unsuccessful attempts to
prosecute Pena-Irala (the man alleged to have tortured and killed Dr. Filartiga's
son) in Paraguay, Dr. Filartiga's daughter, Dolly, found Pena-Irala living in New
York City and had him arrested by the INS." While Pena-Irala was being held in
the United States, the Filartigas filed a complaint in federal court alleging wrongful
death and seeking damages in the amount of $10,000,000.52 The federal court for
the Eastern District of New York dismissed the case based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld jurisdiction
based on the ATCA.53
The court analyzed the question of whether the ATCA applied to this suit on
two levels. At the first level the court asked whether Pena-Irala's actions violated
the "law of nations." A violation of the "law of nations" is a requirement to trigger
application of the ATCA.54 The court answered this question by finding that
torture is unequivocally banned by international law; therefore, Pena-Irala's
actions fell under the ATCA. 55 At the second level, the court analyzed whether a
44. Id. at 342 (citing Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
45. Id. at 342-43 (citing Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999)).
46. Id. at 345-49.
47. Id. at 346 (citing Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002)).
48. Id. at 349-50.
49. Id. at 349-50 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293
(S.D.N.Y Feb. 28. 2002)).
50. Filariga, 630 F.2d at 878.
51. Id. at 878-7 9 .
52. Id. at 879.
53. Id. at 880.
54, Id. at 880 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
s5 /d. at 881. It is important to note that the court considered Pena-Irala's actions to be actions
by the state of Paraguay and not as an individual. (The Second Circuit mentions the states "'power to
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court in the United States was constitutionally authorized to hear a case based on
the violation of international law.56
The Second Circuit noted that the actions complained of in this suit did not
violate a treaty of the United States,57 but that in the absence of a violation of a
treaty the court must also look to the "customs and usages of civilized nations" in
determining what actions may violate the law of nations. 58 Furthermore, the law
that is broken must be universally condemned by civilized nations and not simply
one which one country may find immoral.59 Without that distinction, countries
could try to impose their own moral standards on other countries when the
standards of those other countries are merely different and not necessarily
universally abhorrent. However, the court quickly distinguished torture as
universally condemned by the international community. 60  Given that Pena-Irala
was charged with torture, and the court determined torture to be universally
condemned by the international community, Pena-Irala's actions constituted a
breach of the law of nations which triggered the use of the ATCA in his case.
Next, the court analyzed whether a court in the United States was
constitutionally authorized to hear a case based on the violation of international
law. The court pointed out that the first Judiciary Act of 178961 conferred federal
jurisdiction to cases involving aliens bringing claims alleging violation of
international law.62 Additionally, the court reasoned that the common law of the
United States was based partly on international law and thus incorporated
international law into the national common law. 63 At one point, Pena-Irala made
an argument that the law of nations is only a part of the law of the United States
insofar as Congress has explicitly defined it.64 However, at this point, the court
made its clearest statement regarding the scope and meaning of the ATCA: "we
believe it is sufficient here to construe the Alien Tort Statute, not as granting new
rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal courts for adjudication of the
torture persons held in its custody" and the state's "treatment of its own citizens.")
56. Id. at 885 (Pena-Irala argued that Article III did not confer federal jurisdiction to violations of
international law).
57. Id. at 880.
58. Id. at 880-81 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)).
59. Id. at 881 (discussing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (in Banco
Nacional the Supreme Court decided not to exercise jurisdiction over the case because the wrong in the
case merely represented the differing views of capitalist and socialist nations and not necessarily an act
that was condemned by civilized nations)).
60. Id. at 881-85; See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
61. Id. at 885.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 886 ("The law of nations forms an integral part of the common law, and a review of the
history surrounding the adoption of the Constitution demonstrates that it became a part of the common




rights already recognized by international law. 65 With that statement, the Second
Circuit recognized the ATCA could be used by aliens to redress any wrong by a
state actor that violated established international law.
Filartiga ushered in the federal courts' modem view on international law and
how it could be applied in the United States judicial system. The Second Circuit's
decision in Filartiga reflected a belief that international law had a place in federal
jurisprudence because international law formed a basis of this country's common
law. With that belief, the court held that federal courts could deem States
responsible for their actions when those actions violated international law.
Subsequent decisions would further clarify how the ATCA could form the basis for
lawsuits in the United States.
B. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.: The Liability of Private Entities Under the A TCA
The dispute in Iwanowa arose out of crimes committed during World War II.
During that time, Ford Motor Company had a plant in Germany operated by its
German subsidiary, Ford Werke. 66 The complaint alleged that during the war the
Nazis confiscated the Ford Werke plant and used it to produce military vehicles.
67
In order to operate the plant at a high capacity, the Nazis used forced labor.68 This
forced labor contingent consisted of prisoners taken by the Nazis during their
military operations. The Nazis sold some of these prisoners to Ford Werke to
work in its plant.69
The Nazis took Plaintiff Iwanowa captive in Rostov, Russia in 1942.70 Ford
Werke purchased her and transported her to Ford Werke's plant in Cologne.7 1
Once there, she and others were forced to perform heavy labor, for no pay, while
periodically being beaten by security officials.72 Iwanowa and the rest of the
workers were freed by Allied Forces in 1945. Iwanowa brought a class action suit
against Ford Werke and its parent company, Ford Motor Co., in 1998.
71
Specifically, Iwanowa sought damages for restitution of unjust enrichment and
damages for the pain and suffering caused by the working conditions.74
During litigation of the suit, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
United States federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.75
Iwanowa argued that the ATCA granted subject matter jurisdiction over her claim
because Defendants' actions during World War II violated the law of nations.
76
65. Id. at 887.
66. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 432-33.
70. Id. at 433.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 434.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 437-38. Defendants filed a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the claim and the court treated it
as a factual attack on the pleadings rather than a facial attack.
76. Id. at 438-39 (Discussing that if Iwanowa had claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the
2008
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Defendants challenged the use of the ATCA by saying that Congress did not intend
it to be a private cause of action and also that the ATCA applied only to State
actors and not private actors.77 In response, the court looked to case law and
congressional action, and found that the ATCA did provide for a private right of
action. Following a previous Second Circuit case, the court reasoned that, after
Filartiga, Congress had a golden opportunity to amend the ATCA when it passed
the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), 78 but chose not to do SO.79 The court
emphasized the fact that Congress chose not to address the issue of a private cause
of action under the ATCA even though it could have addressed the issue using the
TVPA.80 The court also drew attention to the fact that the Eleventh Circuit
recognized the ATCA as creating a private right of action after Filartiga.81 Given
the tacit support of other court decisions and the implicit support of Congress, the
court in Iwanowa recognized the ATCA as granting a private right of action.
The court next considered whether the ATCA could apply to a non-state
actor. In reaching its conclusion on this issue the Iwanowa court relied on the
Second Circuit's opinion in Kadic v. Karadzic.83 The Kadic decision recognized
that individuals could be held liable for certain violations of international law,
which included slave labor.84 Turning to numerous sources of international law
and U.S. case law, the court in Iwanowa held that forced or slave labor was a clear
violation of the law of nations.
85
The Iwanowa court recognized that forced labor or slave labor violated jus
cogens norms. 8 6 The court explained, "Jus cogens norms are a narrow subset of
the norms recognized as customary international law. 87 Jus cogens violations are
determined by looking at the treaties and commentary regarding international law
to determine whether the international community recognizes a norm to be so
fundamental as to make it nonderogable. 88 If a private entity commits a violation
of jus cogens norms then it can be held liable as a private entity without being
Geneva or Hague Conventions, her claim would have been dismissed because the ATCA only applies
to self-executing treaties. However, because Iwanowa claimed a violation under the "law of nations"
her suit was able to go forward. Iwanowa met the first requirement of the ATCA (that the person
bringing the suit be an alien) because she was a citizen of Belgium.)
77. Id. at 441.
78. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
79. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 442-43 (citing Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 363 (D.N.J.
1998)).
80. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 443. (discussing how the Torture Victim Protection Act
("TVPA") was passed after Filartiga as an amendment to the ATCA, which would have given
Congress the perfect opportunity to address any concerns it had with the ATCA.)
81. Id. (citing Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (1 Ith Cir. 1996)).
82. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
83. Id. at 445 (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)).
84. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
85. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 439-41.
86. Id. at 441.
87. Id. at 441 n.18 (citing Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
88. lwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 441 n. 18.
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involved in the action with a State actor. 89 The Iwanowa court explained that
Kadic recognized liability for private entities for violations ofjus cogens norms.
90
According to the court, Kadic represented the most recent view of international
law, and since international law is in a constant state of flux, Kadic carried greater
weight than other earlier opinions because it more closely reflected the current
state of international law.91 Given the reasoning in Kadic, the Iwanowa court
accepted the view that private entities could be held liable - outside of state action
- for violations ofjus cogens norms under international law.
92
In the end, Defendants in the Iwanowa case were successful in obtaining a
dismissal because the suit was barred due to the running of the statute of
limitations, treaties made at the conclusion of World War II, and the political
question doctrine.93 While Plaintiff may have lost, the court in Iwanowa added to
the potential reach of the ATCA by supporting liability solely for private entities
for violations ofjus cogens norms.
C. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The "Joint Action" Theory
The injuries claimed in Wiwa were brought about by a corporation using a
local military to support its operations.94 Plaintiffs brought this case against the
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading Company, its
subsidiaries, the Shell Petroleum Company and Shell Development Company of
Nigeria, Ltd. (collectively "Royal Dutch"), and the president of the Nigeria
subsidiary, Brian Anderson. 95 The crimes alleged in Wiwa occurred during the
1990's when Royal Dutch was engaged in extracting oil from land belonging to the
Ogoni people in Nigeria.96 Plaintiffs claimed that Royal Dutch used the Nigerian
89. Although Iwanowa recognized liability for private entities based onjus cogens, it is important
to note thatjus cogens violations merely negate the state action requirement for private entities to be
liable under the ATCA. Private entities can still be liable under the ATCA outside ofjus cogens
violations if their actions are intertwined with a State's, but there must be a showing of state action to
make the case. See id. at 441 ("jus cogens norms are a narrow subset of the norms recognized as
customary international law.") (citing Reagan, 859 F.2d at 940) and id. at 443 ("[i]nstead, we hold that
certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the
auspices of a state or only as private individuals.") (emphasis added) (quoting Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239).
90. "The Kadic court concluded that the inclusion of'slave trade' within both sections 702 and 404
of the Restatement demonstrates that this in an offense of 'universal concern' for which non-state actors
may be liable." Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (quoting Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240).
91. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 444-45 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992)).
92. "No logical reason exists for allowing private individuals and corporations to escape liability
for universally condemned violations of international law merely because they were not acting under
color of law." Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 445. The court in Iwanowa accepted the view that private
individuals could be held accountable for violations of international law, but the court did not find a
basis for invoking the ATCA because it felt that Plaintiff proved that Defendants were de facto State
actors. Id.
93. Id. at 491.
94. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *1.
95. Id. at *1-2.
96. Id. at *2.
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97
military and police to support and protect its oil excavation operations in the area.
The complaint claimed that Plaintiffs and other Ogoni residents were tortured,
raped, and murdered by the police and military who provided support to Royal
Dutch.98
The court decided that in order for Plaintiffs to move forward with their
ATCA claims they would have to prove state action by Defendants.9 9 The court
reasoned that the crimes enumerated in the complaint fell short of the narrow set of
crimes that do not require a showing of state action (jus cogens violations). 100
Because the Plaintiffs had to show state action, the court determined that the
proper test to apply in determining state action was the "joint action" test. 10 1
Under the "joint action" test, private entities are found to be state actors - thus
state action exists - if those private entities willfully participate in joint action with
a State. 10 2 Defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that Royal
Dutch collaborated with the Nigerian government to violate international law.
10 3
The court found otherwise and decided that Plaintiffs did have a cause of action
under the ATCA.
10 4
The complaint cited numerous instances in which Royal Dutch cooperated
with, and directed, the Nigerian police and military. Plaintiffs alleged that Royal
Dutch purchased weapons for the Nigerian police, helped plan raids against the
Ogonis, provided materiel to the military and police, and even ordered violent
responses against any kind of anti-Royal Dutch activities.10 5 The court also held
that the claims against Brian Anderson as a private individual were actionable
under the ATCA for the same reasons they were actionable against Royal Dutch as
a corporation. 10 6  Defendants attempted to argue that Plaintiffs had to produce
evidence showing collaboration between Royal Dutch and the Nigerian
government for each alleged act.10 7 The court disagreed with this argument saying
that §1983 - which the court used to evaluate what state action meant - did not
97. Id.
98. Id. The complaint contained 12 different claims including claims of negligence, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and RICO, but the other claims are not pertinent to the analysis of the
ATCA.
99. Id. at *12-13. State action is defined as "Anything done by a government; esp., in
constitutional law, an intrusion on a person's rights (esp. civil rights) either by a governmental entity or
by a private requirement that can be enforced only by governmental action (such as a racially restrictive
covenant, which requires judicial action for enforcement)." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 672 (3rd Pocket
ed. 2006).
100. Id. at *12. Even though some of the incidents complained of involved summary execution and
torture, the court found that Plaintiffs had to show state action since those violations were not
committed in the course of genocide or war crimes (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243).
101. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *13; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The Wiwa court looked to §
1983 as the standard by which private actors act under color of law with respect to the ATCA.





107. Id. at *14.
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require a showing of concerted action for each specific act."°8 Because Plaintiffs
demonstrated sufficient collaboration to show state action they did not have to
make individual showings of collaboration for each act.
109
The Wiwa opinion represents the recognition of an avenue by which state
action can be proven under the ATCA. This allows for the application of the
ATCA to private entities for crimes outside of the limited set of jus cogens
violations. As long as plaintiffs can show a substantial collaboration between a
private entity and a government to violate international law then they can bring
claims redressing their resulting injuries under the ATCA.
D. Doe v. Unocal.- Aiding and Abetting Under the A TCA
In this case, Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Unocal and others on
behalf of "tens of thousands" of people Plaintiffs said were injured by the actions
of Unocal.' 1 Unocal arose out of conduct similar to that in Wiwa. The injuries in
the case occurred because of a Unocal project to extract natural gas from Myanmar
and transport it via pipeline through Thailand where it could be shipped across the
world."' At this time Myanmar was controlled by the military and the military
"provided security and other services" to Unocal's project." 2 During the project,
local villagers living near project areas alleged that the "security detail" engaged in
numerous human rights violations including: murder, rape, torture, and forced
labor.'" 3 Plaintiffs brought claims under the ATCA, alleging that Unocal worked
with the military junta controlling Myanmar at the time to perpetrate these crimes
and further the business interests of Unocal.'
4
Defendants in this case tried to argue that, as a private entity, they could not
be held liable under the ATCA because their conduct did not equate to state
action. 15 The court held that Unocal's conduct violated jus cogens norms, and
therefore, Plaintiffs did not have to prove state action." 6 The crimes obviating the
need for state action included murder, rape, torture, and forced labor.17
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). Unocal purchased 28% of a project in
Myanmar from the French company, Total S.A. Unocal also owned the Union Oil Company of
California which is actually the company that purchased the interest in the project from Total S.A. Id.
at 937.
111. Id. at 936-37.
112. Id. at 937-38. According to a Unocal memorandum, four battalions of 600 men each were
assigned to protect the pipeline corridor and each survey team had a security detail of 50 soldiers each.
Id. at 938.
113. Id. at 939. Reports alleged that the Myanmar military forced villagers to work on the project
and those that refused or tried to escape were tortured and/or killed. The military also allegedly raped
villagers as well. Id. at 939-40.
114. Id. at 942-44.
115. Id. at 945-46. The court admits that in most instances, in order to bring a claim under the
ATCA, the crimes committed must rise to the level of "state action.7"
116. Id.; see also Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 445.
117. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 946 (citing Kadic, 17 F.3d at 243-44).
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Plaintiffs argued that Defendants were liable under the ATCA because they
aided and abetted the Myanmar military in perpetrating violations of international
law.' 8 While aiding and abetting was a new argument under the ATCA, the court
found it persuasive. It reasoned that the standard for aiding and abetting under the
ATCA was "knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial
effect on the perpetration of the crime."" 9 The Unocal court based this standard
on aiding and abetting standards set by the International Criminal Tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.120 Furthermore, the court held that the mens rea required
for the crime of aiding and abetting was that the defendant must have knowledge,
but intent was not necessary.1
21
The court concluded that sufficient evidence existed to create a genuine issue
of material fact on the allegation of forced labor, murder, and rape, 122 and thus
reversed the district court's ruling and remanded the case back for further
consideration. 23  In regard to the forced labor claims, the court reasoned that
Unocal showed the Myanmar military where to provide security and infrastructure
and did so with the knowledge that the military in that country had a history and
tendency to use forced labor. 124 Furthermore, the court found that the forced labor
would not have occurred but for Unocal hiring the Myanmar military to provide
security for the project. 25  The court made similar findings on the claims of
murder and rape. It said that the actions of Unocal amounted to "practical
assistance" and had a "substantial effect" on the military's ability to carry out these
violations against the local villagers. 126 This assistance occurred when Unocal
provided the military with intelligence on where to carry out security operations. 
27
The decision in Unocal further expanded the reach of the ATCA. It supported
the decision in Iwanowa that certain crimes do not require the actor's conduct to
rise to the level of state action in order for the ATCA to apply. Furthermore,
Unocal created an aiding and abetting standard which could apply liability under
the ATCA. This aiding and abetting standard created a lower threshold to
implicate the use of the ATCA. In Unocal's case, the Ninth Circuit held Plaintiffs
met their burden by showing Unocal knew of the Myanmar military's penchant for
human rights abuses and told the military where to provide security and support.
118. Id. at 947.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 949-50; see Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 209, 234
(Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence, 114 (Jan.
27, 2000).
121. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 951 (citing Musena at 180-81).
122. Id. at 956 (The court concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact in regards to the claims of torture.).
123. Id. at 953 (reversing the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the ATCA claims in
regards to forced labor) and id. at 956 (reversing the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the
ATCA claims in regards to murder and rape).
124. Id. at 952; see also id. at 940 (discussing the fact that Unocal had several warnings that the
military in Myanmar often engaged in human rights violations).
125. Id. at 952-53.




IV. ABTAN, ET AL. V. BLACKWATER LODGE AND TRAINING CENTER, INC., ET AL.:
RESPONSE TO THE MASSACRE AT AL-NISOOR SQUARE
On October 11, 2007 the case of Estate of Himoud Saed Abtan, et al. v.
Blackwater USA, et al., was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia where the plaintiffs claimed Blackwater was liable under the ATCA.
128
The suit was filed in response to the September 16, 2007 al-Nisoor Square
incident.129 The complaint claimed that heavily armed Blackwater personnel
opened fire on innocent civilians in al-Nisoor Square resulting in multiple deaths
and injuries.' 30  The suit named seven plaintiffs and thirteen defendants, which
included all of Blackwater and its subsidiaries as well as Erik Prince as an
individual.
131
This case will mark an important milestone in attempting to hold government
contractors - especially private security contractors - accountable for their actions
overseas. The plaintiffs' success or failure and how the ATCA is interpreted in
this case are important because they could affect the number of future suits and
how they will proceed. The Abtan complaint alleges the following counts: 1) war
crimes; 2) assault and battery; 3) wrongful death; 4) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; 5) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and 6) negligent
hiring, training, and supervision.
132
The Iwanowa court held that the ATCA does create a private cause of action
and that the ATCA can be applied to private individuals. 133  Iwanowa also
discussed how the violation of the narrow subset ofjus cogens norms obviates the
need to prove state action to advance a case under the ATCA. 134 The addition of
war crimes to the counts in Abtan could create a situation in which Plaintiffs would
not have to prove state action under that count in order to recover under the ATCA.
However, the meaning of "war crimes" is unclear in the Abtan complaint and
without that specificity, determining whether Plaintiffs will not have to prove state
action on all the counts is difficult.
Plaintiffs in Abtan will most likely have to proceed under the reasoning set
forth in Wiwa and prove state action in order to hold Blackwater accountable under
the ATCA. Again, the Wiwa court used the "joint action" test to determine state
action as it applies to the ATCA. 135 In order to satisfy the "joint action" test,
128. See Center for Constitutional Rights, current cases, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-
cases/atban%2C-et-al.-v.-blackwater-usao2C-et-al. (last visited Oct. 4, 2008): see also Abtan No. 1:07-
cv-01831 (D.D.C. second amended complaint filed March 28, 2008). On March 28, 2008 the original
case was joined with another suit filed by the family of another of the Iraqis killed in the attack and nine
of the injured Iraqis, changing the name of the case to Abtan. et al. v. Blackwater Lodge and Training
Center, hic., et al. http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/atban,-et-al.-v.-blackwater-usa,-et-al.
129. Abtan, No. 1:07-cv-01831 at 2.
130. Id. at 3.
131. Id. at 4-7.
132. Id. at 16-19.
133. Iwanowa, 395 F.3d at 946-47.
134. Id. at 945-46.
135. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *13.
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plaintiffs must show that a private entity willfully participated in actions with a
State to violate international law. 136 The Wiwa court found willful participation
when Royal Dutch used the Nigerian police and military to protect their oil
ventures in the country. 137 In Wiwa a State's forces were operating under the
direction of a private entity. The opposite is true in Abtan. In Abtan, a private
entity is acting under the orders of a State (the United States) rather than the other
way around; thus, the case is factually different from Wiwa in a very basic, and
possibly important way. However, the "joint action" test merely requires willful
participation by a private entity and a State to break international law.1 31 If the
"joint action" test can apply to a private entity giving orders to a State, then the test
should be applied to a State giving orders to a private entity.
The true hurdle of the "joint action" test is proving willful participation by the
State and private entity. Such evidence seems to exist in the Abtan case. The
aforementioned memorandum to the House Committee for Oversight and
Government Reform references two incidents in which the State Department
worked with Blackwater to essentially cover up incidents in which innocent Iraqis
were killed. One incident involved a drunken Blackwater employee who shot and
killed one of the Iraqi Vice President's guards. 139 Another incident referenced in
the memorandum occurred when Blackwater contractors killed an innocent
bystander in June 2005.140 The Blackwater personnel failed to report the incidents
and even tried to cover up their existence.141  The State Department did not
conduct an investigation as to criminal liability in either incident, and instead
negotiated with Blackwater to pay $15,000 and $5,000 respectively for each
incident.142 The State Department chose to use these measures as an effort to
quickly dispose of the incidents. 
143
The evidence reported in the House memorandum shows cooperation between
the State Department and Blackwater to avoid thorough investigations into
incidents where innocent people were injured or killed. The information in that
memo shows that the State Department was aware of incidents that violate criminal
laws, but did not take the necessary procedures to remedy the situation and actually




139. BLACKWATER MEMORANDUM, supra note 33, at 9-11. The above mentioned incident
happened when the Blackwater employee attempted to enter the Iraqi Prime Minister's compound. The
employee was confronted by one of the Vice President's guards and the employee shot him three times
with a Glock 9mm handgun. The employee fled the scene and was apprehended a few hours later in his
room at the Blackwater compound in Baghdad. When he was apprehended he was determined to be too
drunk to be questioned. The consequences for his actions were that his contract with Blackwater was
terminated and he was flown home to the United States. Id.
140. Id. at 12.
141. Id. at 12-13.
142. Id. at 2.
143. Id. at 12 (In response to the killing of the innocent bystander, correspondence inside the State




correspondence inside the State Department said, "[W]e are all better off getting
this case - and similar cases - behind us quickly. 1 44  The quote by the State
Department official shows that the U.S. government knew that these violations
happened and that they will continue to happen, but that the government will
continue to resolve disputes by paying relatively small sums of money and
avoiding real investigation. Further demonstrating this point, following the
incident involving the Iraqi Vice President's guard, a State Department official
proposed a $250,000 settlement to the family and then reduced it to $100,000.145
Other State Department officials rejected both proposals as being much too large
because setting such a precedent would be very costly for the government. 146 This
type of reasoning is more evidence of the State Department's knowledge that such
incidents happened and will continue to happen, and that they do not want to
properly respond with an investigation and would rather just pay money to cover
the incidents up.
Plaintiffs still have a long row to hoe in proving state action through the "joint
action" test. Since much of the evidence to prove state action is to be found in
internal State Department and Blackwater communications, and communications
between the State Department and Blackwater, evidence could prove difficult to
acquire. However, if the evidence can be obtained, a court could very well find
that state action exists.
The communications revealed in the House memorandum show a desire by a
State to cover up actions by a private entity that violate customary international
law. The communications also show that the State Department expects similar
incidents in the future and plans on dealing with those incidents in a similar way -
by not performing official investigations and using small monetary settlements to
keep incidents quiet. Because Blackwater mainly operates in Iraq under contracts
with the State Department to protect State Department officials, 147 this cooperation
between the State Department (a State agency) and Blackwater (a private entity)
could represent state action and expose Blackwater to liability.
V. CONCLUSION
Accountability and oversight for private security contractors continues to be a
major problem in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 48  Right now, the major
security contractors in Iraq are Blackwater, Aegis, Dyncorp, Erinys and Triple
Canopy.149 All five of these companies are connected to questionable practices in
carrying out their contracts. Aegis is a British security run by a former British
military officer named Tim Spicer. 150  Spicer has a history of committing
144. Id.
145. Id. at 11.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 4 (Blackwater has been awarded over $1.5 billion worth of contracts with the State
Department between 2004 and 2006.).
148. PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS MEMORANDUM, supra note 17, at 7.
149. Id. at 2.
150. SCAHILL, supra note 3, at 159.
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violations against civilian populations in his history as a mercenary.
15 1 Aegis was
accused of committing similar violations in Iraq when internet videos were posted
depicting Aegis contractors firing on civilian vehicles in Iraq. 152  The Erinys
contingent in Iraq is commanded by former South African mercenaries.
153  The
same House memorandum that focuses on Blackwater also mentioned Dyncorp
and Triple Canopy. The report said that, while Blackwater was the biggest
offender as far as unacceptable behavior, DynCorp and Triple Canopy combined
for 138 shooting incidents in Iraq from 2005 to 2007.154 In 62% of their shooting
incidents, DynCorp fired first and in 83% of Triple Canopy's they fired first. 
155
These statistics regarding private security contractors show that a great deal of
abuse by contractors goes unaddressed. The "joint action" test has the potential to
apply not only to action between the U.S. and private contractors, but also
potentially to action between the new Iraqi government and private contractors.
Security contractor Erinys reportedly built up a 14,000 man private army in Iraq
that was partly comprised of Iraqis. That kind of cooperation between a security
contractor and a State is similar to the cooperation in Unocal and opens up the
door for these private entities to use Iraqi forces to commit war crimes or allows
contractors to aid Iraqi forces in committing war crimes.
The Abtan case represents only one instance in which a private security
contractor could be held accountable for its actions overseas. The various types of
jobs these contractors do and the various amounts of cooperation they get from
State actors could allow for ATCA liability under all the theories mentioned here.
Watching how the Abtan case unfolds is important because the decision in the case
and the application of the ATCA could have major effects on holding private
security contractors liable in the future.
151. Id. at 159-60 (Spicer owned and operated another private military firm, Sandline, fighting in
Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone, that was accused use of excessive force against civilians.).
152. Id. at 161; see Videotape: DailyMotion.com, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/
x34kfmbritish-mercenarys-in-iraq (October 4, 2007) (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
153. SCAHILL, supra note 3, at 77.
154. BLACKWATER MEMORANDUM, supra note 33, at 7
155. Id.
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